Nigeria’s banking industry has spent years rebuilding capital, restructuring institutions and celebrating stronger financial performance. Amidst all these developments, one fundamental question remains unanswered. The concern is how much of this financial strength is translating into productive investment, affordable credit, business expansion and employment.
The worry has grown more urgent after the Central Bank of Nigeria’s recapitalisation exercise, which brought in N4.65 trillion, in equity. By the end of March 2026, 33 of the country’s 37 banks had met the updated capital requirements. The exercise aimed to strengthen the system improve resilience and boost banks’ ability to finance economic growth.
But raising capital is not the same as expanding productive credit. A stronger balance sheet is not automatically a stronger economy.
One thing that is certain is that Nigeria’s banking industry is not short of institutions, financial expertise or regulatory reforms. As reality stares at Nigerians, the more difficult question is whether its growing financial capacity is being converted into financing for businesses that produce goods, create jobs, process local raw materials and expand the country’s export base.
Experiences from Morocco’s Attijariwafa Bank, Kenya’s Equity Group Holdings and Togo-headquartered Ecobank Transnational Incorporated offer useful benchmarks. Their institutional development, customer reach and regional operations provide different perspectives on the possibilities of modern African banking. They are not perfect models, and their operating environments differ from Nigeria’s. Nevertheless, their experiences offer a basis for asking whether Nigerian banking reform is delivering enough economic value beyond financial-sector growth.
The real test of recapitalisation is not simply how much capital banks have raised. It is what that capital ultimately enables them to do.
The first question is straightforward: what does a stronger capital base mean or the benefit of strengthening banks’ capital if productive businesses still struggle to obtain credit?
Capital is essential to and the backbone of banking. Amidst its many functions, it helps banks absorb losses, meet regulatory requirements, handle larger transactions and maintain customers’ confidence in their ability to keep their money safe. Nigeria’s recapitalisation exercise was therefore important. But its economic benefits depend partly on how banks deploy their expanded capacity.
The IMF’s May 2026 assessment, with clarity reviewed developments through the first quarter of 2026, found that private-sector credit remained relatively low, at approximately 12 per cent of GDP in 2025. It also observed that, despite growth in lending, which was obviously a huge contradiction, Nigeria’s financial markets were not adequately intermediating domestic savings into productive investment.
This is a more revealing measure of the challenge than the amount of capital raised alone. From the playout of activities, it is obvious that the banking industry can expand its balance sheets without financing a sufficiently broad range of businesses. Established and bigger corporations may obtain credit while smaller manufacturers, agricultural processors and emerging enterprises struggle with high interest rates, collateral requirements and short repayment periods.
The question is not whether Nigerian banks lend. They do. The question is whether the scale, cost and distribution of that lending adequately serve an economy seeking to diversify beyond oil, expand manufacturing and create sustainable employment.
Kenya’s Equity Group Holdings provides a useful point of comparison as this is discussed further. In a real sense, its success in attracting customers, using digital channels and supporting small businesses shows how banks can serve more people while keeping lending risks under control.
The lesson is not that Nigerian banks should simply copy Kenya. No doubt, Nigeria has different economic conditions, regulatory requirements and credit risks that may not apply to Kenya. Rather, the point is that recapitalisation should create opportunities to deepen lending, develop better products and improve the effectiveness of financial intermediation. It should not become a regulatory milestone celebrated independently of its economic consequences.
The second question is perhaps the most consequential: are Nigerian banks financing enough small businesses to make a measurable difference to the real economy? Here, the evidence deserves particular attention.
Findings showed that Equity Bank Kenya’s third-quarter 2025 investor booklet reported that the bank disbursed KSh90.7 billion ($701,255,970) in MSME loans between January and July 2025. Meanwhile, the amount represented 45 per cent of the KSh201 billion ($1,554,044,999) in MSME loan disbursements reported across the Kenyan banks included in its comparison. The booklet attributed the industry comparison to the Kenya Bankers Association.
This is a significant indicator of Equity Bank’s participation in Kenya’s MSME financing market. It suggests that a bank can make small-business lending a prominent part of its commercial activities while operating in a competitive banking system. Whilst Nigeria’s figures raise a different concern.
A research note published in October 2026 by Development Bank of Nigeria, citing the CBN statistical data, noted that credit classified to small-scale enterprises amounted to a meager and paltry N177.44 billion in 2025, when compared with enormous total private-sector credit of N47.10 trillion. The small-scale-enterprise category consequently represented approximately 0.38 per cent of private-sector credit. The same research note showed that the category’s share had declined substantially from its historical levels.
The figures deserve serious scrutiny. They suggest that Nigeria’s banking system has expanded enormously without a corresponding increase in the relative weight of credit recorded for small-scale enterprises.
However, the comparison requires an important qualification. Equity’s KSh90.7 billion ($701,255,970) represents loan disbursements over seven months, whereas Nigeria’s N177.44 billion ($132,417,910.45) represents an outstanding-credit measure for a narrower statistical category. The figures are not directly comparable, and they cannot establish that Equity’s lending performance is superior to that of every Nigerian bank. Nor should Nigeria’s small-scale-enterprise category automatically be treated as equivalent to the entire MSME sector.
That limitation does not invalidate the question. It makes the case for better Nigerian data even more compelling.
Why should a country with a large banking market lack sufficiently clear, consistently reported evidence of how much commercial-bank credit reaches smaller productive enterprises? Why should the industry’s recapitalisation achievements get attention than giving credit to businesses that keep people working and create jobs?
Small businesses really struggle to get financing. They often don’t have things like collateral checked financial records, long credit histories or steady income. Banks need to think about these risks. Lending without checking can lead to loans not being paid back hurt the bank’s money and putting depositors in danger.
But risk management should not become a permanent justification for leaving viable businesses outside formal credit.
The fact is that Nigerian banks could use cash‑flow‑based lending, supply‑chain finance, invoice discounting, purchase‑order finance, movable‑asset collateral and credit guarantees. Nigerian banks would benefit from using verified transaction data to spot businesses that’re truly strong instead of borrowers whose repayment ability is very weak.
The objective is not to compel banks to lend recklessly. It is to make responsible lending to smaller businesses more commercially viable.
The CBN must also ask for reports on SME lending, such, as how many borrowers are active, how many new loans are given, how much money is still owed, what the typical loan size is, what interest rates are used, when loans are due and how well payments are made. Without this data, the country cannot properly determine whether recapitalisation is truly helping people get credit. The CBN needs data to see if the plan is working.
The third question follows naturally: if Nigerian banks are profitable, why is their success not more visible in the productive economy?
Bank profitability is essential. Shareholders put in money to get returns. Depositors want their money to stay safe. Regulators want institutions that can handle economic times. There is nothing bad about banks investing in government securities or other easy-to-sell assets.
The real worry is how the financial system’s rewards and rules shape where capital goes. It’s about whether money flows toward government borrowing or, toward private businesses. That balance matters. How the system rewards choices can tilt capital one way or the other. That can affect economic growth and opportunity.
The CBN’s official Money and Credit Statistics provide a useful snapshot. In July 2026, private-sector credit stood at approximately N83.43 trillion, compared with N83.26 trillion in June. Net credit to government declined from approximately N40.03 trillion in June to N33.92 trillion in July. These are the latest monthly observations displayed in the official CBN series retrieved for this article, rather than figures extrapolated from media reports.
The figures do not establish that banks deliberately abandoned businesses or that every reduction in government credit necessarily results in additional private lending. They show that the composition of domestic credit changes over time and should be examined using consistent data.
The IMF’s 2026 assessment identified banks’ holdings of government securities, high cash reserve requirements and structural constraints as factors limiting private credit. When looking at the data, it is clear that government securities made up 22 percent of banks’ total assets. Government securities can give banks liquidity, steady income and a risk‑return profile that is fairly attractive. Lending to businesses can bring credit risk, expensive monitoring and uncertainty, about repayment. Where government borrowing offers attractive returns, banks have commercial reasons to allocate resources towards sovereign instruments.
The policy concern is not that banks should abandon government securities. It is whether the overall balance of incentives enables enough financing to reach viable private businesses.
Monetary policy also matters. High reserve requirements can constrain the funds available for other uses, although reducing them would not guarantee that the released funds would become productive loans. Credit risk, inflation, the cost of funds and the condition of individual businesses would continue to influence lending decisions.
This is why the CBN and the fiscal authorities must examine the combined effect of monetary policy, government borrowing and prudential requirements on credit allocation.
Morocco’s Attijariwafa Bank is another reference point. Its published 2025 consolidated figures show assets of approximately MAD795.5 billion ($80,580,000,000) and customer loans of MAD447.9 billion ($45,370,000,000). The group operates across markets and has built a large customer base over time.
Those figures do not prove that Morocco has eliminated its financing challenges. They provide a basis for studying how a bank grows a lending franchise builds customer relationships and expands its operations across markets.
For Nigeria, the concern is whether banking‑sector growth is matched by a corresponding expansion, in lending rather than being judged mainly by profits, assets and capital raised.
The fourth question concerns regional influence: why should Nigeria’s banking scale not translate into greater financial leadership across Africa?
Nigeria has a large domestic market, internationally connected businesses and banks with experience in corporate finance, digital banking and cross-border transactions. Some Nigerian institutions have established substantial international operations. Suggesting that the industry has no regional achievements would be inaccurate. Building a domestic banking franchise and creating a durable pan‑African institution are separate challenges.
Ecobank Transnational Incorporated is another example because its history is strongly connected to regional banking integration. Founded in 1985, Ecobank Transnational Incorporated started as an effort and became a bank that supports many African markets.
With this, in 2025, Ecobank Transnational Incorporated also reported a profit before tax of $801 million up 21 percent year‑on‑year and net revenue of $2.45 billion, which went up by 17 percent. Ecobank Transnational Incorporated also reported a capital adequacy ratio of 16.7 percent and a cost‑to‑income ratio of 48.3 percent.
Meanwhile, it should be known that these results show the scale of Ecobank Transnational Incorporated’s operating model but they do not prove that the bank’s operations are free, from challenges. Nor should its dollar-denominated figures be compared directly with the naira results of an individual Nigerian bank without accounting for exchange rates, business mix and reporting differences.
Ecobank’s relevance lies in the development of capabilities that support banking across national boundaries. As African countries pursue deeper economic integration, efficient cross-border payments, trade finance and regional supply-chain financing will become increasingly important.
Nigeria’s banks should be evaluated on how effectively they support these activities. The reality is that a stronger Nigerian banking industry should not only finance large domestic transactions, but truly it should also help Nigerian businesses compete across Africa.
The fifth question brings the argument back to the regulator: what should the CBN demand from banks after recapitalisation?
The first requirement is to recognise that stronger capital does not automatically eliminate financial vulnerabilities.
The IMF said Nigeria’s capital adequacy ratio fell to 11.7 percent in the quarter of 2025. It also indicated that Nigeria’s non‑performing loans rose to 8 percent, which’s above the prudential ceiling. These figures are from Q3 2025, not from the position in October 2026. The IMF blamed this decline on factors, including the effect of naira depreciation on risk‑weighted assets, higher provisioning and the migration of restructured exposures, after the end of COVID‑era regulatory forbearance.
The figures illustrate why capital raising must be accompanied by sustained attention to asset quality. They should not be used to suggest that the industry’s current capital adequacy ratio or non-performing-loan ratio stays at those levels without evidence.
The CBN must continue to focus on sound underwriting, proper provisioning, effective governance and clear reporting. Financial stability cannot be ignored to push for fast credit growth.
At the same time, prudential supervision should go hand in hand with better information about the real economic impact of growth in the banking sector. The CBN could share consistent data across the industry on lending to small and medium enterprises, manufacturing, agriculture and other productive areas. It should also show how loans are spread across borrower sizes along with details on loan maturities and interest rates. It would also help to include data on the link between banks’ holdings of government securities and their lending, to the sector.
Such information would allow policymakers and the public to judge whether recapitalisation is strengthening financial intermediation as well as balance sheets.
The government must also take responsibility for the conditions under which banks operate. Unreliable electricity, poor transport infrastructure, uncertain policies, weak contract enforcement and high operating costs make it harder for businesses to get financing. When companies that could otherwise succeed cannot produce cash flows, banks will naturally become more cautious.
The government needs to improve the investment environment. It must manage its borrowing needs carefully. It should not create incentives that consistently favor government borrowing over private investment. The CBN must strike a balance. It must control inflation. Ensure financial stability while still making sure the credit channel works effectively. Neither institution can solve the problem independently.
The experiences of Attijariwafa Bank, Equity Group and Ecobank do not provide a ready-made blueprint for Nigeria. They offer different examples of institutional development, customer reach, small-business financing and regional expansion.
Their value lies in helping Nigeria ask better questions about what a strong banking industry should deliver.
Nigeria’s banks have contributed to financial sophistication, payments infrastructure, capital formation and corporate financing. Their achievements deserve recognition. But financial success must also be distinguished from the wider economic benefits that a strong banking system is expected to support.
The next phase of banking reform should be measured against three tests. First, do banks have sufficient capital and sound assets to withstand shocks? Second, is credit reaching viable businesses at sustainable terms? Third, is financial intermediation contributing to productive investment, employment and regional trade?
These tests would not require banks to abandon commercial discipline. They would require the industry, its regulator and the government to demonstrate that financial strength is translating into broader economic capacity.
The SME evidence makes this challenge particularly urgent. Nigeria needs better, comparable data on small-business lending, but the available figures already justify a serious investigation into why credit classified to small-scale enterprises represents such a small proportion of total private-sector credit.
Recapitalisation was necessary to strengthen Nigeria’s banks. It should not become the final measure of banking reform. Nigeria has strengthened its banks. The next challenge is to make that strength count more visibly for businesses, jobs and the productive economy.
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